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Central bankers frequently suggest that labor market reform may be beneficial for
inflation management. This paper investigates this topic by simulating the effects of
reductions in firing costs and unemployment benefits on inflation volatility in the Euro
Area, using an estimated New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions.
Qualitatively, changes in labor market policies alter the volatility of inflation in response
to shocks, by affecting the volatility of the three components of real marginal costs
(hiring costs, firing costs and wage costs). Quantitatively, we find, however, that neither
policy is likely to have an important effect on inflation volatility, due to the small
contribution of hiring and firing costs to inflation dynamics.
& 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Policies aimed at regulating the labor market affect the incentives of workers and firms to form and keep employment
relationships, thereby influencing the profit-maximizing behavior of firms. In particular, changes in labor market policies
may affect the extent to which firms adjust their nominal prices in order to accommodate variations in cost and demand
conditions, and hence may alter the response of the overall price level as the economy is hit by shocks. The view that labor
market policies have an effect on price dynamics is also held in policy circles. For example, Jean Claude Trichet, the current
president of the European Central Bank (ECB), has recently emphasized that structural reforms in the labor market may
support stable inflation in the Euro Area: ‘‘the implementation of the reforms in the Lisbon agenda, by easing labor and
product market rigidities, (y) will also improve the effectiveness of monetary policy by facilitating price stability.’’1
Despite the importance of this topic for policy-makers, surprisingly little academic work has focused on the effect of
labor market reform on price stability. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the topic by studying how changes inll rights reserved.
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C. Thomas, F. Zanetti / Journal of Monetary Economics 56 (2009) 885–899886unemployment benefits (UB) and firing costs (FC) may influence the volatility of inflation. We focus on UB and FC because
they are generally considered to be important contributors to the rigidity of continental European labor markets.2
Therefore, a structural reform aimed at increasing the flexibility of the labor market would certainly involve modifications
to these two labor market features.
In order to investigate this topic we set up a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor
market à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In this framework, monopolistically competitive firms set their nominal
prices in a staggered fashion. They optimally adjust the size of their workforce both through job creation and job
destruction. On the job creation side, firms post vacancies. On the job destruction side, firms destroy those jobs that
become unprofitable and pay firing costs for each job destroyed. On the other side of the labor market, unemployed
workers search for jobs and receive unemployment benefits in the meantime. Finally, vacancies and unemployed workers
meet in the so-called matching function. This framework therefore provides a comprehensive treatment of the interaction
between labor market policies, macroeconomic shocks and pricing decisions.
The mechanism by which unemployment benefits and firing costs affect the cyclical volatility of inflation is the
following. In this model, hiring and firing are costly. As a result, hiring and firing costs become part of firms’ real marginal
costs and therefore affect inflation dynamics. A reduction in unemployment benefits reduces workers’ outside option and
thus increases the joint surplus of employment relationships. Since firms receive a constant fraction of the joint surplus,
vacancy posting increases. This makes the labor market tighter, which in turn makes it more costly for firms to hire
workers. As a result, the hiring component of real marginal costs experiences larger fluctuations, and inflation becomes
more volatile. On the other hand, a reduction in firing costs automatically reduces the size of fluctuations in the firing
component of real marginal costs. As a result, inflation becomes less volatile.
In order to assess the quantitative importance of this mechanism, we parameterize our model economy to Euro Area
data, using a mixed method of calibration and maximum likelihood estimation. After showing that the model fits the data
reasonably well, we simulate the effects of hypothetical reductions in UB and FC on inflation volatility. The baseline results
suggest that these labor market reforms would have only small effects on inflation volatility. In particular, reducing the
replacement ratio of UB by 10 percentage points would increase the annualized standard deviation of inflation by only 5
basis points (from 0.84% to 0.89%), whereas reducing firing costs as a fraction of the average wage by 10 percentage points
would reduce inflation volatility by only 2 basis points (from 0.84% to 0.82%). We then test the robustness of these results
to alternative model parameterizations, and show that the effects of labor market reform on inflation volatility remain
small. The explanation for our results is the following. In the case of FC, job destruction rates barely fluctuate in the
estimated model, such that the contribution of the firing component of marginal costs to inflation dynamics is very small.
As a result, a certain percentage change in the volatility of the firing component has a very small absolute effect on inflation
volatility. In the case of UB, the data favor model parameterizations in which hiring costs are small, which is necessary
in order to match observed employment fluctuations. Since the hiring component contributes very little to inflation
dynamics, even large percentage changes in the volatility of hiring costs will have again small absolute effects on
inflation volatility.
Our analysis is closely related to earlier work by Campolmi and Faia (2006) and Zanetti (2007). Campolmi and Faia
(2006) document a negative relationship between the replacement ratio of unemployment benefits and inflation volatility
across Euro Area members. They subsequently build a two-country model of a currency union characterized by matching
frictions and nominal price rigidities, and show that their model is able to reproduce the observed relationship between
unemployment benefits and inflation volatility. Our model abstracts from international spill-overs, by treating the Euro
Area as a single country, and extends the analysis of labor market policies by also considering the effects of firing costs.
Zanetti (2007) sets up a New Keynesian model with labor market search to study how changes in unemployment benefits
and firing costs affect aggregate fluctuations. After calibrating his model to UK data, he finds among other results that an
increase in unemployment benefits reduces the volatility of inflation, while an increase in firing costs makes inflation more
volatile, which is consistent with our results. Differently from Zanetti (2007), where the firms making the pricing decisions
are different from the firms facing search frictions, in our framework firms are subject both to search frictions and
staggered price adjustment, which makes the analysis more appealing from a theoretical point of view. Importantly, we
differ from these two papers in that we estimate a number of key parameters that determine the transmission of shocks to
inflation, such as the size and persistence of shocks, the duration of price contracts and the response of monetary policy to
the state of the economy. In our view, this approach provides a more reliable assessment of the quantitative consequences
of changes in labor market policies on inflation dynamics.
In a broader perspective, our paper is related to previous research that analyzes the effect of search frictions in the labor
market on inflation dynamics. In particular, Krause et al. (2008) use US data on inflation, unit labor costs and several
indicators of labor market activity in order to estimate the New Keynesian Phillips curve that arises in models with search
frictions.3 In such models, the cost of hiring workers adds to the usual wage costs as a determinant of marginal costs. Our
model features a similar expression for marginal costs, with the addition of a firing cost component. Krause et al. (2008)2 See for instance Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Yashiv (2004), Layard et al. (2005) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006).
3 Their empirical implementation is based on theoretical work by Krause and Lubik (2007), Blanchard and Gali (2009) and Rotemberg (2006). See also
Ravenna and Walsh (2008).
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direction as our results for the Euro Area.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 parameterizes the model to
Euro Area data, using both calibration and maximum likelihood estimation. It then assesses the model’s ability to match
the data and analyzes some of its transmission mechanisms. Section 4 presents the baseline results regarding the effect of
labor market reform on price stability, and performs robustness exercises. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
This section presents a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions and endogenous job destruction à la
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Our framework is therefore similar to those of Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007),
Trigari (2009), Campolmi and Faia (2006) and Zanetti (2007).
The model economy is populated by four types of agents: households, firms, a fiscal authority and a monetary authority.
Households consist of a large number of members, a fraction of which are unemployed and search for jobs. On the other
side of the labor market, firms post a number of vacancies. Unemployed workers and vacancies, which are denoted by ut
and vt , respectively, meet in the so-called matching function, mðvt ;utÞ. Normalizing the size of the labor force to 1, ut also
represents the unemployment rate. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale in the matching function, the

















are functions of the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, yt  vt=ut , also called labor market tightness. Notice that p0ðytÞ40
and q0ðytÞo0, i.e. in a tighter labor market jobseekers are more likely to find jobs and firms are less likely to fill their
vacancies. Notice also that pðytÞ ¼ ytqðytÞ.
2.1. Firms
There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed on the unit interval. Inside any firm i, the
timing of hiring and firing proceeds as follows. At the start of the period, a fraction lx of last period’s workers are
exogenously separated from the firm. Aggregate shocks are then realized, after which the firm posts a number vit of
vacancies. Firms are assumed to be large, such that the fraction of vacancies filled by the firm is given by qðytÞ. Once the
hiring round has taken place, both newly hired and continuing workers receive an iid idiosyncratic productivity shock, z. Let
GðzÞ and gðzÞ denote the cumulative distribution function and the density of z, respectively. Those workers whose new
idiosyncratic productivity falls below a certain reservation productivity zRit (to be determined later) become unprofitable
and their jobs are destroyed, whereas the remaining workers start producing immediately.5 The law of motion of the firm’s
workforce, nit , is therefore given by




Þnit1 þ qðytÞvit , (1)
where GðzRitÞ is the fraction of new and continuing workers that are endogenously separated from the firm. The firm’s









where At is an aggregate productivity shock with law of motion log At ¼ rA log At1 þ At , Atiidð0;sAÞ.
2.1.1. Cost minimization











dzþ wvit þ GðzRitÞ½ð1 l
x
Þnit1 þ qðytÞvit F
( )
,
4 They find, however, that search frictions reduce the role of backward-looking price setting for generating inflation persistence.
5 We therefore assume that workers hired in period t start producing in the same period. This assumption has become standard in recent DSGE
applications of the search and matching framework that assume a quarterly frequency, such as Blanchard and Gali (2009), Gertler et al. (2008), Sala et al.
(2008) and Krause et al. (2008).
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tscs=ct is the stochastic discount factor between any two periods s and t ðsotÞ, b is the subjective discount
factor, witðzÞ is the real wage paid to the worker with idiosyncratic productivity z (to be determined later), w40 is the real
cost of posting a vacancy and F is the real firing cost paid by the firm for each endogenous separation. Let fit and jit denote
the Lagrange multipliers associated to Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively. Therefore, fit represents the real marginal value of
employment, and jit the real marginal cost of production. The first-order conditions with respect to vit , nit and zRit are given,
respectively, by

























itþ1ÞFg ¼ 0. (5)
Eq. (3) equalizes the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of posting a vacancy. With probability qðytÞ the vacancy is
filled, in which case two events are possible: either the new recruit is fired (which happens with probability GðzRitÞ), in
which case the firm must pay firing costs, or she survives the job destruction round, in which case she generates value for
the firm. The contribution of the worker with idiosyncratic productivity z to the flow of profits is given by jitAtzwitðzÞ,
which is the gap between the cost reduction due to the worker and her real wage. Since workers have random idiosyncratic
productivities, from Eq. (4) a worker that survives job destruction is expected to contribute the average gap between cost
reduction and real wage, plus a continuation value which is the same for all workers in the firm. Finally, Eq. (5) states that
the value of the worker with idiosyncratic productivity zRit is exactly equal to zero, i.e. the firm is indifferent between









itÞ  ðwitðzÞ witðz
R
itÞÞgðzÞ dz F. (6)



















where Pit is the firm’s price, Pt is the overall price level, gt41 is the time-varying elasticity of substitution between
individual goods in households’ consumption basket and yt is aggregate demand. As is standard in the New Keynesian
literature, we assume staggered price adjustment à la Calvo (1983). Let d denote the probability of price adjustment

























where Pit is the optimal price decision and mt  gt=ðgt  1Þ is a mark-up shock. The latter has law of motion logmt ¼ ð1 rmÞ
log½g=ðg 1Þ þ rm logmt1 þ 
m




There exists a large, representative household with a measure-one continuum of members. A fraction nt ¼
R 1
0 nit di of its
members are employed. The remaining members are engaged in home production, receive unemployment benefits and
search for jobs. All members pool their resources so as to ensure equal consumption.6 The household consumes the









6 The assumption of perfect insurance of unemployment risk is standard in the search and matching literature. See e.g. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto
(1996).
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steady-state average real wage, rB is the replacement ratio of unemployment benefits, Pt are real profits reverted from the
firm sector to households in a lump-sum manner, and tt are real lump-sum taxes. The first-order conditions with respect to
Bt and ct can be combined into the following consumption Euler equation:







Each firm negotiates wages with its employees on a period-by-period basis. As is standard in the search and matching
literature, we assume Nash wage bargaining, which implies that the firm and each worker split the joint surplus of their
employment relationship. The joint surplus is the sum of the firm’s surplus and the worker’s surplus. The worker with
idiosyncratic productivity z enjoys the following surplus:



















is the outside option of the worker. The latter is the sum of home production, h, unemployment benefits, rBw̄, and the value
of searching for other jobs, where pðytþ1Þvjtþ1=vtþ1 is the probability of being matched to any firm j in period t þ 1.7
The surplus enjoyed by the firm from the job with idiosyncratic productivity z is given by JitðzÞ þ F, where











is the value of the job for the firm.8 The worker’s contribution to current profits is given by the amount of product produced
by the worker, Atz, times the real marginal cost of production, jit: given that the firm must always meet its demand, should
the worker quit her job the firm would have to make up for the lost production, which would come at the cost jitAtz. In the
following period, should the worker draw an idiosyncratic productivity x below the new reservation productivity zRitþ1, her
job is destroyed and the firm pays firing costs F; otherwise, the worker keeps on generating value for the firm.
Let x 2 ð0;1Þ denote the firm’s bargaining power. Nash bargaining implies the following surplus-sharing rule:
ð1 xÞðJitðzÞ þ FÞ ¼ xS
w
it ðzÞ.
The latter equation and the expressions for JitðzÞ and S
w
it ðzÞ yield the following solution for the real wage:
witðzÞ ¼ ð1 xÞ½jitAtzþ ð1 Etb
x
t;tþ1ÞF þ xwt , (13)
where bxt;tþ1  bt;tþ1ð1 l
x
Þ. The worker therefore receives a weighted average of her outside option, wt , and the sum of her
contribution to current profits and a firing-cost component. Firing costs affect wage payments in the following way: the7 Notice that the worker’s surplus does not depend on F. As is well known, those components of the cost of firing a worker that represent a transfer
from the firm to the worker (such as severance payments) leave the joint match surplus unaffected and therefore have no effect on job creation and job
destruction under Nash wage bargaining; see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (2003). The parameter F therefore includes only the non-transfer components
of firing costs, such as legal costs, sanctions for delayed payments, as well as foregone health insurance and social security contributions.
8 Since the outside option for the firm in wage negotiations is firing the worker and paying firing costs, the firm’s surplus equals
JitðzÞ  ðFÞ ¼ JitðzÞ þ F. See e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (2003).
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tomorrow. As shown in the appendix, it is possible to write the real wage equation as follows:




t;tþ1wytþ1g þ xðhþ rBw̄Þ. (14)
2.4. Fiscal and monetary policy
Assume for simplicity that firing costs revert to the government. The fiscal authority is assumed to adjust lump-sum
taxes, tt , so as to balance its budget in every period,





Þnit1 þ qðytÞvit di,




tiidð0;sgÞ. On the other
hand, the monetary authority sets interest rates according to a Taylor-type rule,
it ¼ fiit1 þ ð1 fiÞ½fpEt logðPtþ1=PtÞ þfy logðyt=yÞ þ 
m
t , (15)
where fi 2 ½0;1, fp41, fy40, y is steady-state output and mt iidð0;smÞ.
9
2.5. Equilibrium
At this point we guess that all firms face the same real marginal cost, jit ¼ jt , and choose the same reservation
productivity, zRit ¼ z
R
t . Eq. (14) implies that wtðzÞ wtðz
R






ðz zRt ÞgðzÞdz F. (16)
Evaluating the real wage function at zRt and using the resulting expression in Eq. (7), the latter can be written as












where bx  bð1 lxÞ. Eqs. (16) and (17) jointly determine the firm’s real marginal cost, jt , and reservation productivity, zRt ,
given the evolution of the aggregate variables At , yt and ct . Since the latter are common to all firms, our previous guess that
jt and zRt are equalized across firms is verified.
10 A common real marginal cost also implies that all price-setters make the
same price decision, that is, Pit ¼ P

t in Eq. (9). The law of motion of aggregate employment can be obtained by aggregating
Eq. (1) across firms,




Þnt1 þ qðytÞvt , (18)
where vt ¼
R 1
0 vit di is the aggregate number of vacancies. The stock of jobseekers at the start of the period evolves
according to
ut ¼ 1 nt1 þ l
xnt1. (19)
Aggregate demand is given by
yt ¼ ct þ wvt þ gt . (20)
Eqs. (2) and (8) imply that Atnit
R
zRt
z½gðzÞ=ð1 GðzRt ÞÞdz ¼ ðPit=PtÞ
gt yt , that is, each firm’s supply must meet its own











gt di is a measure of price dispersion with law of motion11









Finally, the price level evolves according to
Pt ¼ ½dP
1gt
t1 þ ð1 dÞðP

t Þ
1gt 1=ð1gt Þ. (23)9 For supportive evidence on the plausibility of the Taylor rule as a description of actual ECB monetary policy, see e.g. Christoffel et al. (2008), Rabanal
(2009) and Christoffel and Kuester (2009).
10 This does not mean, however, that all firms are symmetric in equilibrium. Given the price dispersion created by staggered price adjustment, firms
will also differ in their output levels, yit , the size of their workforce, nit , and their number of vacancies, vit .
11 See e.g. Yun (1996).
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t¼0 that satisfies Eq. (9) (without i









t¼0, the laws of motion of fAt ; gt ;mtg and the initial values of the endogenous state variables, fi1;n1;D1; P1g.
For future reference, we also define after-hiring unemployment, Ut  1 nt , which is the fraction of the labor force that is
left without a job after hiring has taken place in period t. Job creation and job destruction are defined as jct  qðytÞvt and
jdt  ltnt1 þ GðzRt Þjct , respectively, where lt  l
x
þ ð1 lxÞGðzRt Þ is the total separation rate. Eq. (18) can then be written as
nt ¼ nt1 þ jct  jdt .3. Model parameterization and assessment
The model is partly calibrated and partly estimated with quarterly Euro Area data. Our strategy consists of calibrating
those parameters that affect the steady state and estimating the remaining parameters. The calibration is discussed first.3.1. Calibration
As is common in real business cycle studies, the quarterly discount rate b is set to 0.99. Following Blanchard and Gali
(2009), we set the steady-state after-hiring unemployment rate, U, to 0.10 and the steady-state quarterly job finding rate,
pðyÞ, to 0.25. The employment rate is then given by n ¼ 1 U ¼ 0:90. Eq. (18), together with qðytÞvt ¼ pðytÞut and Eq. (19),
imply that the following condition must hold in the steady state:
n ¼ ð1 lnÞpðyÞ=½lþ ð1 lÞpðyÞ, (24)
where ln  GðzRÞ and l  lx þ ð1 lxÞln are, respectively, the endogenous separation rate and the total separation rate in
the steady state. The values of ln estimated for the US are typically centered around one half of the total separation rate.12
Lacking similar evidence for the Euro Area, we assume ln ¼ l=2. Using this in Eq. (24), and given the values of pðyÞ and n,
we obtain l ¼ 0:0312, which implies ln ¼ 0:0156 and lx ¼ ðl lnÞ=ð1 lnÞ ¼ 0:0159. The stock of jobseekers equals
u ¼ 1 ð1 lxÞn ¼ 0:11. We adopt Andolfatto’s (1996) calibration of the US quarterly vacancy-filling rate, qðyÞ ¼ 0:90. It
then follows that y ¼ pðyÞ=qðyÞ ¼ 0:28. This implies v ¼ yu ¼ 0:032. The matching function is assumed to be Cobb–Douglas,
mðv;uÞ ¼ Bvu1. Extrapolating again from US evidence, we set  to 0.6 (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989). Since pðyÞ ¼ By,
the scale parameter B must equal pðyÞ=y ¼ 0:54. Following common practice, the bargaining power parameter is set equal
to the elasticity of the matching function, x ¼ .13 The elasticity of demand curves, g, is set to 6 following Blanchard and Gali
(2009), which implies a steady-state real marginal cost of j ¼ ðg 1Þ=g ¼ 0:83.
The parameters controlling labor market reform are calibrated as follows. In the model, F is the part of the total cost of
firing a worker that does not represent a transfer from the firm to the worker. Given the lack of a reliable estimate of this
cost for the Euro Area as a whole, we set it to 20% of the quarterly average real wage. Expressing firing costs as F ¼ rFw̄, we
thus assume rF ¼ 0:20. According to Nickell and Nunziata (2007), average replacement ratios in the four largest Euro Area
members in the period 1998–2004 (i.e., roughly our estimation sample) range from 39% (Spain) to 58% (Germany). Given
that such benefits accrue indefinitely to unemployed workers in the model but have a limited duration in actual
legislations, we set the common Euro Area replacement ratio to rB ¼ 0:40.
Following standard practice in the literature, the idiosyncratic productivity shock z is assumed to be
lognormally distributed, logðzÞNðmz;szÞ, where mz is normalized to 0.
14 Regarding sz, given the lack of direct micro
evidence on this parameter we set it on the basis of our macro data set. In particular, we consider four different
values of sz: 0.20, 0.30, 0.40 and 0.50.15 For each of these values, we compute the steady state, log-linearize the
model around that steady state and estimate it by maximum likelihood. We find that the likelihood of the model is
highest for sz ¼ 0:20 and choose this value as our baseline.16 Our quantitative conclusions, however, are not sensitive to
this parameter, as is shown later. Given the values of mz, sz and l
n, the reservation productivity equals




RÞÞdz ¼ 1:03. In the steady state, Eqs. (16) and (17) and the cross-sectional average of Eq. (14)12 Den Haan et al. (2000) set ln=l to 32%, whereas Pissarides (2007) estimates that endogenous separations account for 60% of all separations. The
midpoint of these estimates is 46%.
13 Our choice of x does not affect our quantitative conclusions. Robustness results in this respect are available upon request from the authors.
14 See e.g. Den Haan et al. (2000), Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007) and Trigari (2009).
15 For values of sz lower than 0.18, the model’s steady-state equations imply negative values for w, which violates the non-negativity constraint on this
parameter. This is why we choose 0.20 as the lowest value in the grid.
16 While it would be desirable to directly estimate this parameter by maximum likelihood, such an approach is very problematic. The reason is that
many of the steady-state values which appear in the coefficients of the log-linear approximation (and which are not being estimated) depend on the value




Maximum likelihood estimation results.
Estimate Standard error Description
sA 0.0026 0.0003 Standard dev., productivity shock
sg 0.0810 0.0428 Standard dev., government shock
sm 0.1000 – Standard dev., mark-up shock
sm 0.0010 0.0001 Standard dev., interest rate shock
rA 0.86 0.0382 Autocorrelation, productivity shock
rg 0.97 0.0165 Autocorrelation, government shock
rm 0.00 – Autocorrelation, mark-up shock
fp 3.15 1.1990 Taylor rule coefficient, inflation
fy 0.02 0.0662 Taylor rule coefficient, output
fi 0.70 0.0640 Interest rate smoothing
d 0.88 0.0061 Fraction of sticky prices
Data for maximum likelihood estimation: GDP at constant prices, total domestic employment, year-on-year growth rate of GDP deflator (all three
seasonally adjusted) and 3-month Euribor; source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse; sample period: 1997:Q1–2007:Q4. Upper bound of 10% imposed on
the standard deviation of all shocks.






ðz zRÞgðzÞdz rFw̄, (25)
xzRj ¼ bð1 lxÞ ð1 xÞwy w
qðyÞ
 
þ xðhþ rBw̄Þ  ½xþ ð1 xÞbð1 l
x
Þð1 pðyÞÞrFw̄,






dzþ ½1 ð1 pðyÞÞbð1 lxÞF þ bð1 lxÞwy
 
þ xðhþ rBw̄Þ,
which can be used to solve for home production, h ¼ 0:48, the cost of posting a vacancy, w ¼ 0:013, and the average real
wage, w̄ ¼ 0:85. Aggregate output equals y ¼ nz̄ ¼ 0:92. Finally, assuming a ratio of government spending to GDP of
g=y ¼ 0:20, consumption is given by c ¼ yð1 g=yÞ  wv ¼ 0:74.
3.2. Estimation
The remaining structural parameters ðsA;sg ;sm;sm;rA;rg ;rm;fp;fi; dÞ are estimated by constrained maximum
likelihood.18 In particular, we impose an upper bound of 10% on the standard deviation of all shocks. In order to match
the number of shocks in the model, we choose four observable variables: real output ðytÞ, employment ðntÞ, year-on-year
inflation ðpyoyt  log Pt  log Pt4Þ and the nominal interest rate ðitÞ. The Euro Area as such exists since 1999:Q1. This leaves
us with a relatively short sample. We follow the argument in Rabanal (2009) that by 1997 convergence in national nominal
interest rates had been nearly reached. We therefore use data from 1997:Q1 to 2007:Q4, which gives us 44 observations.19
Employment and real GDP are logged and linearly detrended, whereas inflation and nominal interest rates are demeaned.
Table 1 displays the estimation results. Overall, parameter estimates are fairly precise, with the exception of the
standard error of the government shock ðsgÞ, and the coefficient on expected inflation in the Taylor rule ðfpÞ. The
productivity and government shocks turn out to be quite persistent, whereas the data favor a mark-up shock with no
persistence. The estimated Calvo parameter implies an average duration of price contracts, 1=ð1 dÞ, of about seven and a
half quarters, i.e. almost two years. This is clearly too long in the light of micro evidence for the Euro Area, but is a common
result in models that lack a real price rigidity mechanism.20 Finally, the upper bound on the shock standard deviations
becomes binding in the case of sm.
3.3. Model assessment
We next assess the estimated model’s ability to match the data in our sample. Fig. 1 compares each observed series with
the corresponding one-period-ahead forecast obtained by applying the Kalman filter on the state-space representation of17 We are normalizing the steady-state level of exogenous productivity, A, to 1.
18 The estimation and all the subsequent simulations are based on a log-linear approximation of the model around a zero-inflation steady state. We
use the software DYNARE in all the exercises.
19 The data are obtained from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. The series are GDP at constant prices, total domestic employment, the GDP deflator
(all three seasonally adjusted) and the 3-month Euribor. We also estimated the model using the rate of change of the Harmonized CPI as our measure of
inflation (the CPI and the GDP deflator are equivalent in the model). We found the estimation results to be nearly identical.
20 Real price rigidities arise in situations in which individual marginal cost curves are upward-sloping, which is not the case in the present framework.
Such rigidities have the effect of slowing price adjustment for a given average frequency of price adjustment. Equivalently, they reduce the amount of
price stickiness that is needed to match inflation dynamics. On this question, see Altig et al. (2004) or Woodford (2005).
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Fig. 1. Data versus fitted values of the observable variables. Data description: GDP at constant prices, total domestic employment, year-on-year growth
rate of GDP deflator and 3-month Euribor; source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse; sample period: 1997:Q1–2007:Q4. Nominal interest rates are shown in
annualized terms. Fitted values correspond to one-period-ahead forecasts performed by Kalman-filtering the state-space representation of the estimated
model.
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Overall, the fit is reasonably good, especially for output, employment and year-on-year inflation.
As a further check, we compared the autocovariance function of the observable variables in the estimated model with
that of the actual data. The results can be found in the appendix to this paper. Overall, such results indicate that the fit is
fairly good. In particular, the variance and the autocovariances of each individual variable are well captured. In other words,
the model replicates well the size and persistence of fluctuations in the observable variables. Regarding the cross-
covariances between all four observable variables, in virtually all cases the model confidence interval contains the
corresponding sample moment.3.4. Impulse-response analysis
In order to illustrate the transmission mechanisms in the model, we now simulate the economy’s response to
productivity shocks (as an example of supply shock) and to government spending shocks (as an example of demand
shock).21
Fig. 2 displays the response to a positive productivity shock. Following the shock, inflation goes down and the central
bank cuts nominal interest rates, which boosts consumption spending. The upsurge in demand is strong enough that firms
still need to increase employment despite the improvement in labor productivity. As shown in the lower-right panel, most
of the employment adjustment takes place along the job creation margin. In particular, vacancies experience a large21 The impulse-responses to nominal interest rate shocks can be found in the appendix. Regarding mark-up shocks, since they are estimated to be
white noise (such that their effects on inflation last for one period) and nominal interest rates respond to expected inflation, such shocks have no effect on
any endogenous variable other than inflation.
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Fig. 2. Impulse-responses to a positive productivity shock. Note: all variables in %; ‘‘inflation’’ refers to quarter-on-quarter inflation; inflation and nominal
interest rate in annualized terms; size of the shock equals one standard deviation.
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downward-sloping Beveridge curve.
Fig. 3 shows the response to a positive government spending shock. Following the shock, output and employment
increase. The response of both variables is almost identical, which implies that average idiosyncratic productivity, z̄t , barely
changes. Once again, employment adjusts mainly along the job creation margin, due in particular to a large expansion of
vacancy posting in the impact period. While vacancies return quickly to their steady state, the correlation with
unemployment is again negative (49% conditional on this shock). The expansion in economic activity puts upward
pressure on real marginal costs, leading to a persistent increase in inflation.
4. Effects of labor market reform on price stability
This section simulates the effects on price stability of hypothetical labor market reforms in our estimated model of the
Euro Area. It is useful first to take a closer look at the determinants of inflation. Once the model is log-linearized, the
dynamics of quarterly inflation ðpt  log Pt  log Pt1Þ are described by the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve
pt ¼ kĵt þ bEtptþ1 þ km̂t , (26)
where k  ð1 dÞð1 dbÞ=d and hats denote log-deviations from steady state. Inflation is thus driven by real marginal





















wtðzÞ½gðzÞ=ð1 GðzRt ÞÞdz and z̄t 
R
zRt
z½gðzÞ=ð1 GðzRt ÞÞdz are the average real wage and the average
idiosyncratic productivity, respectively, and lnt  GðzRt Þ is the endogenous job destruction rate. Therefore, the real marginal
cost equals the ratio of the effective cost of increasing employment at the margin (the expression in square brackets) over
the increase in production due to the new hires ðAtz̄tÞ. The effective cost of increasing employment equals the cost of hiring
workers corrected by the probability that they do not survive job destruction, w=½qðytÞð1 lnt Þ, plus the cost of firing those
who fall below the reservation productivity, ½lnt =ð1 l
n
t ÞF, plus the average wage paid to those who stay in the firm, w̄t ,
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Fig. 3. Impulse-responses to a positive government shock. Note: all variables in %; ‘‘inflation’’ refers to quarter-on-quarter inflation; inflation and nominal
interest rate in annualized terms; size of the shock equals one standard deviation.
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x
t;tþ1w=qðytþ1Þ. Using the aggregate production function, yt ¼ Atntz̄t , real



















where we have also used the fact that ð1 lnt Þð1 l
x
Þ ¼ 1 lt . Therefore, marginal costs are the sum of a hiring component
(the expression in square brackets), a firing component, and the labor share of GDP, ntw̄t=yt . We now make use of an
approximation similar to the one employed by Blanchard and Gali (2009). Notice first that vacancy posting costs, w ¼ 0:013,
and separation rates, ln ¼ 0:016 ¼ l=2, are of the same order of magnitude as the fluctuations of the endogenous variables
in the marginal cost expression, with the exception of yt , which experiences larger fluctuations.22 Once the above equation
is log-linearized, all terms multiplied by w, ln or l become second-order terms, except for those involving ŷt . This yields the










t þ n̂t  ŷtÞ þ
w̄
z̄
ð b̄wt þ n̂t  ŷtÞ,22 Log-linearizing Eqs. (18) and (19) and combining the resulting expressions, we obtain the following law of motion of employment:





Þ þ lŷt ,
where  ¼ 0:6 in our calibration. Therefore, first-order fluctuations in employment and the endogenous job destruction rate must be accompanied by first-
order fluctuations in lŷt . Since l is itself first-order, ŷt must experience fluctuations of a larger magnitude. Under our baseline calibration, the standard






Effects of labor market reform on inflation volatility and its components.
Baseline rB ¼ 0:30 rF ¼ 0:10
varðpÞ 0.7063 0.8003 0.6722
varðpapproxÞ 0.7255 0.8047 0.6752
varðhcÞ þ 2covðhc; lsÞ 0.0030 0.0144 0.0023
varðfcÞ þ 2covðfc; lsþ hcÞ 0.0258 0.0241 0.0054
varðlsÞ 0.1766 0.2462 0.1474
sðpÞ 0.8404 0.8946 0.8199
Steady-state effects
w=½qðyÞz̄ 0.0146 0.0335 0.0209
F=z̄ 0.1660 0.1662 0.0815
w̄=z̄ 0.8301 0.8311 0.8148
z̄ 1.0268 1.0233 1.0704
Note: Standard deviations are multiplied by 400 (so as to express them in annualized terms and in %), variances by 4002. In each column, the variance of
papprox (second row) is the sum of the elements in the third to fifth rows, plus an exogenous mark-up shock component.





n. Combining the latter equation with Eq. (26) finally yields the following approximate expression for
inflation dynamics:





















T þ n̂T  ŷT Þ,








bTtEtð b̄wT þ n̂T  ŷT Þ,
and the exogenous mark-up shock component, km̂t=ð1 brmÞ. The variance of approximate inflation can then be
decomposed as follows:






where covs collects the sum of all covariances between the four components of inflation.
What is the effect on price stability that should be expected from reductions in unemployment benefits and firing costs?
A reduction in unemployment benefits reduces the outside option of workers and thus increases the joint surplus of all jobs.
Since firms receive a constant fraction of the joint surplus (by virtue of Nash wage bargaining), the expected benefit from
new hires increases and so does vacancy posting. As the labor market becomes tighter, the steady-state probability of filling
a vacancy, qðyÞ, falls and thus the steady-state cost of hiring, w=qðyÞ, increases. As a result, in response to shocks, the same
percentage fluctuations in labor market tightness, ŷt , produce larger percentage fluctuations in hiring costs,
½w=qðyÞð1 Þŷt . This should increase the volatility of the hiring component of inflation, hct , thus making inflation more
volatile. This effect is reinforced by the effect of hiring costs on average real wages, w̄t . The latter are increasing in
Etb
x
t;tþ1 wytþ1, which is the (expected discounted value of the) product of the probability of finding another job, pðytþ1Þ,
times hiring costs, w=qðytþ1Þ.23 Since percentage fluctuations in Etbxt;tþ1wytþ1 are given by b
xwyEtðb̂
x
t;tþ1 þ ŷtþ1Þ, it follows
that the increase in y increases the size of percentage fluctuations in average real wages. As a result, we should observe an
increase both in the variance of the labor share component of inflation, lst , and in its covariance with hct . This should
reinforce the increase in inflation volatility.23 As shown in Section 2.3, the worker surplus in alternative jobs is increasing in hiring costs.
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Table 3
Effects of labor market reform on inflation volatility, alternative parameterizations.
sz ¼ 0:30 sz ¼ 0:40
Baseline rB ¼ 0:30 rF ¼ 0:10 Baseline rB ¼ 0:30 rF ¼ 0:10
varðpÞ 0.7376 0.9051 0.7090 0.7930 1.1814 0.7489
varðpapproxÞ 0.7478 0.8700 0.7068 0.8001 1.1276 0.7385
varðhcÞ þ 2covðhc; lsÞ 0.0142 0.0996 0.0069 0.0347 0.3191 0.0108
varðfcÞ þ 2covðfc; lsþ hcÞ 0.0310 0.0323 0.0088 0.0433 0.0450 0.0172
varðlsÞ 0.1875 0.2230 0.1759 0.2150 0.2564 0.2035
sðpÞ 0.8588 0.9514 0.8420 0.8905 1.0869 0.8654
Steady-state effects
w=½qðyÞz̄ 0.0823 0.1483 0.0972 0.1372 0.2244 0.1527
F=z̄ 0.1655 0.1659 0.0814 0.1650 0.1655 0.0811
w̄=z̄ 0.8273 0.8293 0.8140 0.8250 0.8275 0.8108
z̄ 1.0551 1.0466 1.0896 1.0946 1.0834 1.1319
Note: sz represents the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Standard deviations are multiplied by 400 (so as to express them in
annualized terms and in %), variances by 4002. In each column, the variance of papprox (second row) is the sum of the elements in the third to fifth rows,
plus an exogenous mark-up shock component.
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TtEtðŷT  n̂T Þ. This should make inflation less volatile.4.1. Baseline results
Table 2 displays the effects of reducing the replacement ratio of unemployment benefits (rB, from 40% to 30%) and firing
costs (rF , from 20% to 10%) on the variance of p
approx
t and its components (except the variance of the mark-up shock
component, which remains constant).24 In order to check the accuracy of our approximation, the actual variance of
inflation in the log-linearized economy ðptÞ is also computed.
In the case of a reduction in unemployment benefits, three results stand out. First, the variance of inflation increases, as
anticipated, but it does so by a very small amount. Transforming the variance into a more informative metric such as the
annualized standard deviation (sixth row of Table 2), we find that the latter increases by just 5 basis points, from 0.84% to
0.89%. Second, this small increase is driven mainly by an increase in the variance of the labor share component, which in
turn is due almost entirely to a rise in the variance of the expected discounted path of average real wages.25 Third, the
hiring component and its covariance with the labor share component move in the direction we anticipated, but their
contribution to the change in inflation volatility is very modest. The reason is the following. In order to match the volatility
of employment in the Euro Area, the estimation favors model parameterizations in which hiring costs are small. As shown
in the ‘‘steady-state effects’’ part of Table 2, steady-state hiring costs in the baseline economy are just 1.46% of average
worker productivity. This way, even though fluctuations in labor market tightness are substantial, hiring costs account for a
tiny portion of the variance of inflation. As a result, even a large percentage change in varðhctÞ will have a small absolute
effect on varðpapproxt Þ.
In the case of a reduction in firing costs, inflation volatility falls, as hypothesized. However, the change is again very
small: from 0.84% to 0.82% in terms of the annualized standard deviation. As expected, the variance of the firing component
of inflation, fct , and its covariance with the other components fall. However, the fact that the endogenous separation rate,
l̂
n
t , barely fluctuates in the estimated model (with a 0.05% standard deviation) implies that the firing component makes a
negligible contribution to inflation volatility. As a result, a certain percentage change in varðfctÞ will have again small
absolute effects on varðpapproxt Þ.24 In the estimated model, the covariance between mark-up shocks and the other components of inflation is zero. The reason is that, since mark-up
shocks are estimated to be white noise (such that their effects on inflation are transitory) and nominal interest rates respond to expected inflation, such
shocks have no effect on any endogenous variable other than inflation. It follows that the term covs in Eq. (27) is simply the sum of covariances between
hct , fct and lst .




TtEtðŷT  n̂T Þ. These terms, however, have a negligible effect. First, w̄=z̄ barely changes following the reduction in rB , as shown in the
‘‘steady-state effects’’ part of Table 2. Also, since ŷt  n̂t ¼ log At þ b̄zt and average idiosyncratic productivity ðb̄ztÞ is nearly acyclical, the expected path of
labor productivity is basically exogenous and thus its variance remains virtually unaffected.
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As discussed in Section 3, we estimated the model under four different values of the standard deviation of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks (0.20, 0.30, 0.40 and 0.50) and found that the model’s fit of the data was best for sz ¼ 0:20. In fact, the
likelihood function evaluated at the estimated parameters decreases monotonically as we increase sz in our grid. A feature
of the baseline calibration is that the value of vacancy posting costs ðwÞ consistent with the steady state of the model is very
small, such that hiring costs play almost no role in inflation dynamics. As sz increases and the distribution of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks becomes more spread out, the distance between the average and the reservation productivity
increases, which from Eq. (25) increases the marginal benefit of hiring in the steady state. As a result, the value of w
consistent with the steady state of the model increases, and with it the relevance of hiring costs for inflation volatility. As a
robustness check, we now simulate the effect of labor market reform on price stability under two alternative values of sz:
0.30 and 0.40.26 The results are displayed in Table 3.
Compared to the baseline results in Table 2, the effects of the reduction in unemployment benefits are now somewhat
more pronounced. In the case of sz ¼ 0:30, the annualized standard deviation of inflation increases by 9 basis points, from
0.86% to 0.95%. For sz ¼ 0:40, the increase is of 20 basis points, from 0.89% to 1.09%. The reason is that hiring costs are now
higher in the baseline economy (w=qðyÞz̄ now equals 8.23% and 13.72%, respectively), such that a certain percentage change
in the volatility of hiring costs has a larger absolute effect on inflation volatility. Indeed, most of the rise in the variance of
inflation is now explained by the rise in the variance of hct and its covariance with lst .
Regarding the effects of a reduction in firing costs, the message barely changes with respect to the baseline results. In
both cases, inflation volatility falls but it does so by a very small amount: 2 basis points in the case of sz ¼ 0:30, and 2.5
basis points for sz ¼ 0:40.
To summarize the robustness results, increasing the variance of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks magnifies the
effect of reductions in unemployment benefits on inflation volatility, due to the greater importance of hiring costs for
inflation dynamics. However, these results should be taken with caution, because the model’s fit of the data also worsens as
sz increases, as indicated by the value of the likelihood function. And in any case, the effects remain small.
5. Conclusions
This paper has studied the effect that changes in labor market policies, in the form of unemployment benefits and firing
costs, may have on price stability. Our analysis is based on a New Keynesian model in which the labor market is subject to
search and matching frictions. We take the theoretical model to Euro Area data and provide a quantitative answer to our
question. We find that changes in unemployment benefits or firing costs are unlikely to have a significant impact on the
volatility of inflation. As far as firing costs are concerned, job destruction rates are nearly acyclical in the estimated model,
such that changes in firing costs have very little effect on the firing component of real marginal costs and hence on
inflation. Changes in unemployment benefits can have important effects on the volatility of the hiring component of real
marginal costs. This, however, has a small effect on inflation volatility, because Euro Area data favor model
parameterizations in which hiring costs are small.
The analysis of this paper is conducted using a search and matching model of the labor market, which is only one
possible way of analyzing the effect of labor market reforms on inflation dynamics. It would be interesting to establish
whether the same results carry over to other environments such as the search-island model (Lucas and Prescott, 1974;
Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998, 2006), the insider–outsider model (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower,
1988), or a model where firms fire workers only in certain states (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).
Within the realm of the search and matching framework, an important extension of the analysis presented here would
be to incorporate stickiness in real wages, which is likely to interact with labor market policies in shaping the behavior of
inflation. This will prove to be a difficult task, however, because of the theoretical requirement known as the ‘‘Barro
critique’’, namely that wage stickiness should not lead to the destruction of jobs that command a positive joint surplus. Hall
(2005) derived the analytical conditions under which such a requirement holds in a simple matching model, and Gertler
and Trigari (2009) and Thomas (2008) show numerically that more complex DSGE models with matching frictions can also
be virtually immune to the Barro critique. All these papers, however, assume exogenous job destruction. Developing a
tractable model with endogenous job destruction and wage stickiness that avoids the Barro critique is therefore an
important task for future research.
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Sala, L., Söderström, U., Trigari, A., 2008. Monetary policy under uncertainty in an estimated model with labor market frictions. Journal of Monetary
Economics 55 (5), 983–1006.
Thomas, C., 2008. Search and matching frictions and optimal monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 55 (5), 936–956.
Trigari, A., 2009. Equilibrium unemployment, job flows and inflation dynamics. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 41 (1), 1–33.
Walsh, C., 2005. Labor market search, sticky prices and interest rate rules. Review of Economic Dynamics 8 (4), 829–849.
Woodford, M., 2005. Firm-specific capital and the new-Keynesian Phillips curve. International Journal of Central Banking 1 (2), 1–46.
Yashiv, E., 2004. Macroeconomic policy lessons of labor market frictions. European Economic Review 48 (2), 259–284.
Yun, T., 1996. Nominal price rigidity, money supply endogeneity and business cycles. Journal of Monetary Economics 37 (2), 345–370.
Zanetti, F., 2007. Labor market institutions and aggregate fluctuations in a search and matching model, Bank of England Working Paper No. 333.
